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Abstract
An often cited explanation for the weak growth effects of education in developing
countries is the misallocation of educated workers to inefficient activities in the public
sector. This paper assesses the strength of this argument by studying the effect of
educational attainment on employment status of Tunisian men. We exploit policy
changes that restricted access to secondary education in the 1970’s as an instrument
for education and use data from 2004 Tunisian census as well as 2010 Labor Force
Survey to estimate the effect of education on working in different sectors and within
specific occupational categories. Consistently with the misallocation argument, we find
that education increases employment, but that this increase is concentrated either in
relatively low skill white collar occupations or in the public sector. Given that our
instrument probably affected the academically weaker students this pattern of results
suggests that the public sector might inefficiently reward titles.
Keywords: Returns to education; Middle East in North Africa; Public sector;
Occupations
1 Introduction
Inefficient allocation of skilled labor across different economic activities is often cited
as one the of the primary reasons for the disappointingly weak growth effects of pub-
lic investments in education in many developing countries. According to this argument,
often attributed to Pritchett (2001), education works as a gateway to inefficient activities,
such as unproductive public sector employment, rather than boosting productivity in the
competitive and open sectors of the economy.
Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries are usually portrayed as pri-
mary examples of countries where expectations related to educational investments have
not been fulfilled. Even though these countries invested heavily in education after gain-
ing independence in post WW II period, the economic growth has been disappointing.
Indeed, Makdisi et al. (2003) show that the level education has not been a significant
determinant of economic growth in MENA countries. The experience of Tunisia is a typ-
ical example of this pattern. Investment in education was for a long time larger than in
most countries in the developing region. Despite these investments, however, both GDP
growth and total factor productivity growth have been very low since the 1980’s.
Previous literature on the effects of education investments in MENA countries has
focused on the estimation of private returns to education and typically reports estimates
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that are comparable to the ones obtained in industrialized countries. This pattern of
results would suggest that, at least at the private level, educational investment does pay
off also in this region. However, previous literature also points to potential inefficien-
cies. Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) report estimates that seem to suggest that returns are
convex in the level of education in Egypt and Iran and interpret this as evidence of
“sheepskin effects”, that is returns attached to official degrees rather than actual learning.
Assaad (1997) and Tansel (2005) provide evidence on the attractiveness of public sector
employment for university graduates in Egypt and Turkey, respectively.
However, due to lack of suitable instruments, this literature has been unable to address
the causality of these estimates. Isolating the causal effect of education is important
because the observed patterns could be driven by relevant unobserved factors correlated
with educational attainment, such as the capacity to finance education or unobserved
productive skills (credit constraints and ability bias, respectively). For instance, convexity
of estimated returns to education could be due to the fact that higher levels of education
are costly so that credit constrained individuals are left out, and extra return premia are
generated for these levels. The attractiveness of the public sector to university graduates
could be potentially driven by a successful public sector selection on the basis of abil-
ity. None of these explanations would imply that the education is used to access privately
rewarding but inefficient activities.
This paper is an attempt to assess the extent of inefficient absorption of educated indi-
viduals by the public sector in Tunisia by providing evidence on the effect of education
on the employment status of Tunisian men in different sectors. Our estimates purge the
effect of education from the aforementioned biases by exploiting a policy change that
restricted the access to secondary schools for several cohorts in the 1970’s. We use this
policy change as an instrument for educational attainment and use Tunisian census and
labor force survey data to estimate the effect of educational attainment on occupational
outcomes.
The education policy change we exploit took place after the rapid expansion of public
education in the 1960’s. This growth of public education led to increased budgetary pres-
sures to which the Tunisian government responded by restricting the access to secondary
education drastically. The promotion rates to secondary education were decreased by
15 percentage points starting in 1971 and remained at low levels until 1980 when they
were increased again approximately back to the level where they were before 1971. These
policy changes, both limiting and subsequently loosening of entry to secondary school,
generate between cohorts variation in educational attainment and we use this varia-
tion as an instrument for educational attainment. The first stage results suggest that the
policy change is a strong instrument: individuals that were affected by the reform com-
pleted on average one grade less of education1. The compliers of our instrument (i.e.
the people affected by the policy change) are likely to have been students at the mar-
gin of passing to secondary school and therefore probably academically weak in relative
terms.
We use micro data from Tunisian 2004 census and 2010 Labor Force Survey to esti-
mate the effect of educational attainment on employment and occupational status of
men in different sectors, focusing on the distinctions between the public and the private
corporate sector. Descriptive statistics and OLS results suggest no inefficient over-
representation of educated workers in the public sector. The public administration does
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employ more college workers, but this appears to be due to the specific occupational
structure of the sector, particularly its abundance of health and education workers.
Hence, the descriptive evidence would suggest that educated workers are not allocated
inefficiently in the Tunisian labor market and that we would need to look for alternative
explanations for the lack of economic growth from educational investment.
However, using the changes in the access to secondary education as an instrument for
education does deliver results that are consistent with inefficient absorption of educated
workers by the public sector. First, IV estimates of the effect of education on working in
the public sector exceeds the effect on working in the private sector. This suggests that
educational attainment, when purged from the effect of other productive characteristics,
works as a gateway to public sector jobs in the Tunisian labor market. The pattern, how-
ever, could still be driven by differing occupation structures across sectors. Our second set
of results thus focuses on differences across sectors in selected occupations. We find no
effect of education onwhite collar occupations in themultinational sector, with the excep-
tion of clerical work, the least skill-intensive of our white collar occupations. In contrast
we find a clear effect of education on most white collar occupations in the public sector.
The pattern is most striking for managerial occupations: this effect is large in the public
sector, considerably weaker in the private Tunisian sector and essentially nonexistent in
the multinational sector.
The interpretation of these results as inefficient absorption of educated workers by the
public sector is strengthened by the fact that our estimates probably apply to relatively
academically weak students that should have benefited least from the acquisition of tech-
nical skills at school. This is because the policy that we use as our instrument is likely
to have shocked the education level of students at the margin of accessing secondary
school. Consistent with this idea, we find no effect of education on natural science occu-
pations in any sector even though natural science occupations should be the most skill
intensive occupations in our data. We argue that the fact that education increased the
chances of presumably “marginal” students to work as managers in the public sector but
not in the multinational sector is consistent with the idea that the public administration
hires and promotes workers inefficiently, rewarding titles rather than actual skills. Hence,
even if our identification strategy does not allow us to formally distinguish the effects of
titles from years of education, this pattern of results is consistent with the public sector
sheepskins effects discussed in the earlier literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we present a
short history of educational investment in Tunisia and describe the policy reform that
we will exploit in our identification strategy. The third section describes the data sets
used in the analysis and presents some descriptive statistics on the allocation of educated
workers in the Tunisian labor market. We then move on to present the results on the
effect of educational attainment on the employment status. We report IV estimates of the
effect of education on the probability of working in different sectors on average as well as
separately for certain occupations. The fifth section concludes.
2 Education investment in Tunisia
Tunisia obtained its independence from France in 1956 in a relatively peaceful way. A
single-party regime ensued, led by the Neo-Destourian party that had fought and negoti-
ated the independence. The political power was highly concentrated in the hands of the
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party leader, Habib Bourguiba. The party and its leader had a strong developmental and
modernizing agenda. One of the key instruments of modernization was to be the spread
of education to the Tunisian masses.
2.1 Expansion of education after independence
At the eve of independence the average level of educational attainment was very low
in Tunisia. In 1955, primary school enrollment was only 30% among 6-9 year olds and
the overall illiteracy rate in the whole population was as high as 84% (Tarifa 1971). The
new regime spent great efforts to expand education. An education reform in 1958 fore-
saw complete schooling of six year olds by 1967 and allowed for a relatively open access
to secondary school (around 40% access rate from primary to secondary) (Tibi 1974).
Expenditures in education reached 4.3% of GNP in 1965, larger than the average for any
developing region (Bousnina 1991). Enrollment rates of 6-9 year olds soared to 70% in
1967, only ten years after independence and enrollment in secondary schoolingmore than
tripled from 1958 to 1966 (Tarifa 1971).
Despite the quantitative success of the policy of educational expansion, by the end
of the 1960s several problems were identified. First, as enrollments increased, so did
the budget required to sustain the system. By 1970, expenditures in education reached
6% of GNP, a figure even higher than that of developed countries (UNESCO 1976
Yearbook, quoted in (Bousnina 1991)). As expansion at the primary level spilled over
increasingly to the much more expensive secondary and tertiary levels, there was a risk
of explosive budget increases. Second, repetition rates were high, both at the primary
and secondary levels. The concern emerged that the expansion into the secondary level
had been too massive, leading to unsustainable education budgets and large numbers
of unprepared students in secondary schools who did not progress at the appropriate
rate.
2.2 The policy reform of the 1970’s
As a reaction to these problems the promotion rate into secondary school was dropped
suddenly from 40% to around 25% in 1971 (see Figure 1). During a full decade promotion
rates remained at such low levels. Meanwhile the budget, which in 1974 remained at 6.1 of
GNP (UNESCO 1976 Yearbook, quoted in Bousnina (1991)), appears to have somewhat
stabilized. However, these changes led to a new problem: a large amount of youth below
16 years old were left out of the educational system at an age where they were still not
ready to join the workforce. In that context, promotion rates were brought back to around
40% in 1980 (Figure 1).
These two sudden changes in promotion rates form the basis for our instrument for
education. There are several reasons why we believe these changes can be considered
exogenous. First, the fact that promotion rates change so suddenly and remain relatively
constant within each regime strongly suggests that it is driven by policy, not by some
secular changes in cohorts. Second, contemporary observers appear to agree that the
changes were policy induced, at least when it comes to the first drop (Tibi (1974), Allman
(1979)). Finally, there is evidence that grades thresholds required to pass into secondary
school were politically manipulated during that period. In the minutes of a 1974 meeting
at the Education Ministry, it is stated that “We have admitted [to secondary school] only
the candidates having passed the threshold except in the disadvantaged provinces, where,
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Figure 1 Promotion rates into secondary school. Share of students in the last year of primary school
promoted to secondary school. Sources: (Tarifa 1971) and annual statistical reports on primary education by
the Tunisian Ministry of Education.
as a political option, it was decided to lower the threshold to 9.6 [from the ‘theoretical’
threshold of 10]” (emphasis added), (Ministère de l’Education Nationale (1974)). This
statement strongly suggests that promotion rates were seen as a relevant political issue
that warranted government intervention and that the intervention was (partly) done by
changing the passing threshold where and when necessary.
We construct an instrument for education using these changes in promotion rates. We
call the years of low promotion rates, the low promotion regime. Our instrument is a
variable that captures exposure of different cohorts to the low promotion regime. If no
one repeated grades, the instrument would take value one for cohorts reaching 12 years
old between 1971 and 1980. Because of grade repetition, cohorts older than that had some
exposure to the low promotion regime whereas the younger of these cohorts had only
a limited exposure. Below, we describe the instrument in more detail and show that the
policy used had a strong impact on the number of grades completed as well as on the
probability of continuing studies beyond primary school.
Under the LATE interpretation, the IV estimates that follow reflect the effect of school-
ing for the “compliers” of our instrument, i.e. the people whose schooling was affected
by the policy. Although compliers are unobserved and we lack predetermined variables
to characterize them, we conjecture that the compliers in our case ought to have been
relatively academically weak students. This conjecture is based on the nature of the instru-
ment, which made access to secondary school more difficult, thus presumably blocking
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schooling to the “marginal” students. The conjectured identity of the compliers plays a
role in the interpretation of our results below.
3 Data
We use two datasets in our analysis: The 2004 Tunisian Census and the 2010 Tunisian
Labor Force Survey (LFS)2. Our version of the 2004 Census has individual information
on one fourth of Tunisian households (2,157,325 individuals). The LFS sample consists of
549,015 individuals. The census data are our primary source for the analysis; the LFS is
used as a complement where appropriate.
3.1 Variables
Both datasets include individual information on education, labor market outcomes and
demographic characteristics, as well as characteristics of the household such as posses-
sion of certain assets (cars, washing machines, etc.) which we will use to construct a
wealth index3. In addition, both datasets provide sampling weights which we use in all
our analyses below.
As was explained above, our analysis relies on policy changes affecting cohorts born
around the 1960s. Thus, we restrict our sample to individuals born after 1945 and before
1980. This leaves us with around 10 to 15 cohorts before and after the cohorts affected
by the policy and has the virtue of excluding most of retired people as well as students.
Moreover, we observe a clear agglomeration of observations with round years of birth,
i.e. at years ending in 0 or in 5. This is likely to represent individuals unsure of their
exact birth year. Because these individuals are not randomly selected, but rather appear
to display particularly low education levels, we erase these observations. Finally, because
the policy of interest had a substantially stronger impact on males than on females, we
restrict our analysis to males. We end up with 354,610 census observations and 78,786
LFS observations4.
The main variables we will use in our analysis are the number of grades completed
that we use to measure educational attainment, the occupation related variables (sector
or place of employment and occupation) and the index of wealth. For education, both
datasets already include variables on the level of education reached (none, primary, sec-
ondary, university) as well as a variable with the number of grades completed of the
respective education level (for example, the data would tell that an individual reached
secondary school, but completed only 2 grades of secondary school). From these two
variables, we construct the total years of education (“grades completed”) on the basis of
official length of each level for these cohorts, assuming a primary education of 6 grades
and a secondary education of 7 grades (the individual of the example would thus be
assigned 8 grades completed).
The occupation-related variables include a variable on “workplace” and a 2-digit occu-
pation category variable. The workplace variable includes as categories public administra-
tion, public companies, private Tunisian companies, multinational or mixed companies,
shops, home, ambulant, agricultural, construction building, other construction sites and
other places. From this variable, we will focus on the four first categories, public adminis-
tration and the three types of company, which we will denote from now on “sectors”. The
occupation variable consists of 9 main categories, each subdivided into two to five sub-
categories. The main categories are management, scientists, technicians, clerks, vendors,
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farmers, craftsmen, machine operators and unskilled workers. We will mainly focus on
the while collar workers which are the first four ones.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
We are primarily interested in the links between educational attainment, wealth, sector of
employment and occupation. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of these variables
in our samples. Recall that both samples are restricted to specific cohorts of middle-aged
males, that were between 24 and 59 when the Census was taken in 2004 and between
30 and 65 at the time of the LFS, in 2010. The table shows that our sample of males
have on average more than 7 years of education, one more than the length of primary
school. Employment rates are unsurprisingly high, at around 80%. The wealth index has
no natural interpretation of units but it is useful to notice the scale of the index as proxied
by a standard deviation of 2 (the index ranges roughly from -10 to 10).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean cns SD cns Mean lfs SD lfs
Grades completed 7.562 5 7.867 5








Public admin 0.190 0.172
Public company 0.032 0.034





Agricultural site 0.106 0.123
Construction building 0.126 0.139
Construction other 0.006 0.006










Machine Operator 0.087 0.083
Unskilled Worker 0.225 0.168
None 0.143 0.156
Males born between 1945 and 1980. Cns refers to the census data and lfs to the labor force survey. Employment sector
refers to the response to a question about place of work.
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Table 1 shows that the public sector is a significant, although not massive, provider of
employment. Around one fourth of the employed in our samples work in the public sec-
tor, either in the administration (most of them), or in public companies. Employment
in private companies is somewhat lower but not substantially so, as are employment
in agricultural fields and at construction sites. From here onwards our interest will lie
in the first four employment sectors (public administration, public companies, private
Tunisian companies and multinationals), and we will lump together the other workplaces.
Regarding occupations, in what follows we will be focusing specifically on white collar
occupations (managers, scientists, technicians, and clerks), and we will disaggregate these
further when useful.
The last feature to notice in Table 1 is the similarity between the census and the LFS
figures, which gives certain confidence on the quality of the data. The main differences
between the two samples are the slightly higher proportion of employed and managers in
the LFS, both of which are consistent with the cohorts being older in that sample.
As a first pass at the question of skill absorption by the public sector, Table 2 displays the
skill distribution within the different sectors. The numbers in Table 2 do suggest that the
public sector is skill intensive. In particular, the public administration employs the largest
share of workers with college, relative to other sectors. Still, both public and private sector
companies are skill intensive relative to the other workplaces. Private Tunisian companies
are slightly less skilled intensive than the other types of companies. The differences in
skill are broadly mirrored in differences in average wealth of workers in different sectors.
Notice also that public companies and multinationals are very similar in skill composition
(as well as in size, as could be seen in the previous table). In the analysis below it will often
be useful to focus on comparisons between these two sectors.
That the public administration is the most skill intensive need not imply that the public
sector is absorbing college students inefficiently. The technological requirements of pub-
lic administration may be such that comparatively more skills are needed to perform its
tasks. We thus examine whether the differences in skill appear to be driven by differences
in occupation types or to skill levels within occupations. Table 3 shows the distribution
of occupations across sectors, where we have disaggregated white collar occupations into
subcategories. The last row shows the marginal distribution of sectors, for comparison. It
is clear that there are strong differences in occupation across sectors. Our four selected
sectors have a clear overrepresentation of top occupation categories relative to the “other”
workplaces. The same applies to the public administration, relative to public and private
companies. The public administration employs a disproportionate share of education and
health workers, occupations with high skill requirements.
Table 2 Distribution of skill andmean wealth by sector
None Primary Secondary College Grades completed Wealth
Public admin 0.050 0.17 0.46 0.329 11.3 1.22
Public company 0.066 0.28 0.48 0.166 9.2 1.28
Private Tunisian company 0.066 0.35 0.44 0.149 8.7 0.75
Multinat 0.036 0.30 0.48 0.186 9.5 1.04
Others 0.194 0.51 0.27 0.028 5.5 −0.55
None 0.194 0.31 0.30 0.191 7.7 −0.29
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Senior Govt and CEO 0.943 0.0223 0.015 0.0045 0.014 0.001
Company Director 0.324 0.0952 0.443 0.0918 0.043 0.003
SME Manager 0.007 0.0049 0.100 0.0057 0.881 0.002
Scientist
Natural Scientist 0.323 0.1363 0.361 0.0875 0.089 0.003
Life Scientist 0.522 0.0276 0.088 0.0146 0.345 0.002
Secondary and University
Teacher
0.965 0.0076 0.010 0.0018 0.014 0.001
Other Scientist 0.361 0.0568 0.291 0.0481 0.240 0.004
Technician
Natural Science Technician 0.277 0.1544 0.350 0.0875 0.130 0.002
Life Science Technician 0.778 0.0377 0.086 0.0103 0.087 0.001
Primary School Teacher 0.920 0.0079 0.018 0.0007 0.051 0.002
Other Technician 0.378 0.0649 0.336 0.0545 0.162 0.005
Clerk
Secretary 0.585 0.0961 0.228 0.0393 0.048 0.003
Receptionist 0.373 0.1319 0.308 0.0535 0.131 0.003
Others
Vendor 0.376 0.0180 0.131 0.0211 0.451 0.003
Farmer 0.016 0.0057 0.019 0.0028 0.956 0.001
Craftsman 0.043 0.0353 0.175 0.0236 0.721 0.002
Machine Operator 0.117 0.0680 0.312 0.0525 0.448 0.004
Unskilled Worker 0.116 0.0284 0.134 0.0249 0.694 0.002
None 0.006 0.0004 0.003 0.0005 0.003 0.987
All
All 0.190 0.0322 0.139 0.0234 0.472 0.144
In order to check if, in addition to differences in occupational structure, the pub-
lic administration displays high skill intensity also within occupations, we select certain
occupational categories. We do so because making cross sectoral comparisons within
occupations that are not homogeneously distributed across sectors are likely to be mis-
leading (for instance, the tiny amount of education workers in themultinational sector are
likely to be essentially different than the large amount of public sector educational work-
ers; comparisons between them are likely to be potentially misleading).We will thus focus
on occupations that are roughly proportionately distributed across sectors: among man-
agement we select company directors; as scientists and technicians we select scientific
and other occupations; and as clerical jobs we select both subcategories.
Table 4 shows the average grades completed within the selected occupation categories
and sectors.Within each occupation category, mean education levels are relatively similar
across sectors (except “other scientists”, that display lower education levels in the public
administration). Certainly there are no large systematic differences between sectors: the
unusual skill intensity of the public administration appears to be due to its occupation
composition rather than the skill content in each occupation.
Table 4 also provides some additional confidence regarding the quality of the data used.
Education levels by occupation category are sensible, with highest levels for scientists and
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Table 4Mean grades completed and wealth by occupation and sector
Grades completed Wealth
Public Public Private Multinat All All
admin company Tunisian
company
Company Director 15.0 14.6 14.0 14.1 14.3 3.47
Natural Scientist 16.6 16.9 16.9 17.2 16.8 3.36
Other Scientist 13.5 14.9 15.5 15.7 14.8 2.43
Natural Science Technician 12.5 12.2 12.1 12.8 12.0 1.63
Other Technician 11.9 11.3 11.8 12.0 11.3 1.62
Secretary 10.8 10.3 10.9 11.0 10.8 1.26
Receptionist 9.8 10.4 10.6 11.3 10.0 1.25
lowest levels for clerks. The table shows in its last column the mean wealth level for each
occupation category. Here again, results are reassuring, with wealth levels increasing with
the occupational hierarchy. Consistent with what one would expect directors display on
average slightly higher wealth levels than natural scientists, despite their lower average
educational attainment.
In summary, the descriptive analysis does not point to any obvious overhiring of edu-
cated workers by the public sector. Public companies have similar skill distributions than
private ones (particularly multinational ones). The public administration does employ
more college graduates than public and private companies, but this appears to be mainly
related to the specific occupational structure of the public sector and not the skill con-
tent within occupations. However, it is important to note that the descriptive statistics
presented here do not really inform us about the effect of educational attainment on the
employment status. Since education is likely to be correlated with other determinants
of employment status the correlations between education and allocation of workers in
these table is, at least partly, spurious. To understand how educational attainment affects
employment status among Tunisian men, we exploit the policy changes of the 1970’s in
the following section.
4 Results
The hypothesis we attempt to test with our instrumental variable identification strategy is
that the Tunisian public sector absorbs workers with skills, obtained through education,
that are unrewarded in the open sector. Hence, we would expect educational attainment
to affect the probability of working in specific occupations in the public sector posi-
tively, while there should be no effect on working in these occupations in the multi-
national sector.
We test this hypothesis by regressing the probability of being employed in selected
occupations in the public, private Tunisian, and multinational sectors on educational
attainment. We denote these probabilities with Yi,s,o, where i refers to individuals, s to
sectors and o to occupations. The empirical framework for estimating these effects is
given by:
Yi,s,o = f (Ci) + βSCHi + i,s,o (1)
where Ci denotes the birth cohort of individual i and SCHi refers to i’s level of schooling
measured by grades completed.We specify the function f as a flexible polynomial of birth
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year and in our baseline regressions we use a polynomial of order three. We also apply
polynomials of order five in robustness checks5.
However, since educational attainment is likely to be correlated with unobservable
determinants of employment outcomes, the level of schooling SCHi will be correlated
with the error term  in (1). Typical examples of sources of such omitted variable bias are
unobserved ability and the financial resources of the family, both of which are likely to
be positively correlated with educational attainment as well as employment. To overcome
this endogeneity problem we exploit the policy reform described in section 2, and specify
SCHi as:
SCHi = f (Ci) + γRi + vi (2)
where Ri is our reform variable. We first report estimates for sectors aggregating across
all occupations and in a second step we show the results disaggregated by occupation.
The reform variable R is coded as follows. As was explained above the regime decreased
access to secondary education in 1971 and then increased it again in 1980. As the
secondary school entry age in the Tunisian system is 12, without any grade repeti-
tion this variable would take values one for cohorts born between 1959 and 1968
and zero otherwise. However, due to widespread grade repetition some cohorts born
before 1959 were also affected by the stricter access requirements of 1971. In the same
way, parts of the cohorts born between 1964-1968 were affected by the more lenient
regime. In order to take into account repetition rates in this manner, we use informa-
tion detailing the year-of-birth composition of each primary school grade in (Ministère
de l’Education Nationale 1983) and extrapolate this information to the two instances of
policy change. We end up with exposure equaling one for the cohort reaching 12 in
1971 (born in 1969), and decreasing almost linearly for 4 older cohorts (0.8 for those
born in 1958, 0.53 for those born in 1957, etc.). The reverse applies to the 1980 policy
change.
For our reform variable Ri to be a valid instrument for schooling it needs to be cor-
related with schooling and not to be correlated with any determinants of employment
status that are excluded from equation (1). Figure 2 depicts the values of the variable R
by birth cohorts. We believe that the specific form of our instrument, implying not only
one policy change, but two changes (the drop in promotions rates and the subsequent
recovery) at arbitrary points in time, lends credibility to the validity of the instrument.
It is possible that the education policy changes in 1971 and 1980 were accompanied by
public sector employment reforms. Even in that case, however, this would be unlikely
to threat the validity of our instrument. The reason is that the instrument refers to
cohorts turning 12 years old between 1971 and 1980. These cohorts would have been
too young at those times to be affected by any possible contemporaneous public sector
reform.
4.1 First stage results
The OLS estimates of the effect of the policy reform on grades completed is reported in
Table 5. As is clear from the table, the reform decreased the amount of grades completed
by approximately one, a relatively large amount. The satisfactory performance of the
instrument is also apparent when inspecting graphs of educational attainment by cohort.
Figure 3 shows grades completed by birth cohort, using the census data. Together with the
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Figure 2 Value of the instrument by birth cohort.
means by cohort, the figure shows predictions from the first-stage regressions (3rd order
polynomial) with the instrument turned on (solid line) and also turned off (dashed line).
Together Table 5 and Figure 3 clearly show that restricting access to secondary education
in the 1970’s had an effect on educational attainment.
In order to assess the trustworthiness of our instrument, we compare the distribution
of grades completed by nearby cohorts distinguishing between those fully exposed to the
policy and those not exposed. Figure 4 shows the CDFs of cohorts born in 1959 or 1964
(first and last fully exposed to the low promotion regime) and those born in 1954 and
1968 (closest cohorts among the not exposed). The vertical lines in the figure correspond
to the grades at which primary, secondary and the standard tertiary education end. The
distribution of grades completed of exposed cohorts is first-order dominated by that of
cohorts not exposed. Most importantly, the two cohorts have the same distribution up
to the end of primary school, where they diverge substantially. This is in line with the
Table 5 First stage regressions of grades completed on exposure to the reform
1 2 3
Grades completed -0.952 -0.785 -0.992
(0.034)*** (0.058)*** (0.073)***
Data.used cns cns lfs
Poly.order 3 5 3
N 352129 352129 77982
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. OLS regressions of grades completed on the
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Figure 3 Graphical depiction of the first stage: Educational attainment by birth cohort. Black dots
show the mean grades completed of each cohort. The solid line corresponds to the predicted grades
completed from a regression on a polynomial of birth cohort and the instrument. The dashed line is the
same but with the instrument turned off.
postulated effect of the reformwe use as instrument, which restricted access to secondary
school.
Figure 4 also shows that the reform had a complex effect on educational attainment.
The reform had the largest impact at the secondary school level, but also led to some clear
differences at the university level. In other words, it seems that the reform blocked the
entrance to secondary school for some students that would have dropped out of school
during secondary school as well as for some students who would have continued all
the way to university. This complexity is also apparent when considering the differences
between the exposed and unexposed cohorts in terms of diplomas obtained, as shown in
Table 6. This table clearly reveals that restricting access to secondary school led to signifi-
cant declines in the shares of individuals with only secondary degrees or bachelors degrees
from university. Hence, the policy reform was effective in blocking individuals from com-
pleting secondary or tertiary education. At the same time, it didn’t lead to substantial
decreases in the share of individuals with vocational degrees or PhD’s6.
The policy we use as instrument thus clearly led to a decrease in educational attainment
for the affected cohorts. However, attainment was affected in such a complex way that
we are not able to use our instrument to disentangle the effect of secondary education
from that of university education or the effect of titles from that of the learning coming
from additional years of education. Our choice of endogenous variable is thus to a certain
extent arbitrary, and we choose grades completed for clarity.
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Figure 4 Distribution of grades completed of nearby exposed and unexposed birth cohorts. Low
promotion cohorts are those born in 1959 and 1964, the first and last to be fully exposed to the reduction in
promotion rates into secondary school. High promotion cohorts are those born in 1954 and 1968, the
cohorts closest to the above fully unexposed to the reduction in promotion rates.
4.2 The effect of education on occupational status
The first question we consider is the effect of education on the probability of obtaining
employment in the public sector and in private companies. Table 7 reports both IV and
OLS results, using our two datasets. Consider first the IV results using the census data.
All coefficients are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. The chances
of working in the public sector and in private companies increase with the number of
grades completed. The coefficients differ substantially across sectors, partly because the
sectors are of substantially different size. However, differences remain large even when
focusing on the size of the coefficient relative to the size of the sector (as given in the
before-last row). For the public administration, where around 20% of the workforce are
employed, the mere fact of obtaining a one more grade of schooling increases the chances
Table 6 Diplomas obtained by nearby exposed and unexposed cohorts
High promotion Low promotion Difference P-value difference
Vocational training 0.050 0.055 −0.005 0.021
Diploma before
completed secondary
0.039 0.035 0.004 0.017
Secondary school only 0.039 0.029 0.010 0.000
University BA/MA 0.074 0.053 0.021 0.000
PhD 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.178
Other diplomas 0.028 0.032 −0.004 0.008
Low promotion cohorts are those born in 1959 and 1964, the first and last to be fully exposed to the reduction in promotion
rates into secondary school. High promotion cohorts are those born in 1954 and 1968, the cohorts closest to the above fully
unexposed to the reduction in promotion rates.
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Table 7 IV and OLS estimates of the effect of education on sector of employment
1 2 3 4
IV.cns 0.0556 0.0070 0.0116 0.00378
(0.0028)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0024)*** (0.00098)***
OLS.cns 0.02871 0.002457 0.00543 0.001593
(0.00015)*** (0.000066)*** (0.00012)*** (0.000056)***
IV.lfs 0.057 0.0051 0.0012 0.0022
(0.011)*** (0.0059) (0.0095) (0.0046)
OLS.lfs 0.02822 0.00394 0.00545 0.00238
(0.00033)*** (0.00017)*** (0.00028)*** (0.00016)***
Outcome.var Public admin Public company Private Tunisian Multinat
company
Mean.outc 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.03
SD.outc 0.39 0.19 0.34 0.18
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. Coefficients for grades completed in OLS and
2SLS regressions of working in different sectors on grades completed and a birth cohort polynomial. Outcome variables are
dummy variables taking value one if the individual works in the respective sector and zero otherwise. 2SLS estimates use
reform exposure as instrument. Cns refers to the census data and lfs to the labor force survey. Mean.outc and SD.outc refer
to the mean and the standard deviation of the respective outcome.
of working there by a staggering 33%. The effect is also very large for public companies
at 18%. The effects are smallest in relative terms (though still significant) for the private
sector companies, where an additional grade leads to 10% increase in the probability of
working in the sector. The estimates are somewhat reduced when using the LFS instead
of the census.
An important thing to note in Table 7 is that the OLS estimates tend to be lower than
the IV ones. At first sight, this pattern of result would seem difficult to reconcile with the
interpretation that the compliers of our instrument are the academically weak students.
Indeed, the traditional LATE interpretation of the IV estimates would in that case imply
that IV estimates should be lower than the OLS estimates7. Often downward biases in
OLS estimates are explained by measurement error in education variables. However, in
our case the most likely interpretation for this pattern of results is that the substantial
non-linearities in the impact of education on the sector of employment are causing the
IV estimates to exceed OLS estimates.
Figure 5 sheds light on the non-linearity in the association between education and the
sector of employment. The figure reports the OLS estimates of the impact of education
on the probability of working in the public sector and multinational companies using
dummies for grades completed as education variables. As is obvious from Figure 5, the
OLS association between schooling and the probability of working in the public sector
is strongest between grades 6 to 13 which correspond to grades in secondary school.
Our instruments affect education precisely in these ranges (see Figure 4 above). If we re-
estimate the OLS regressions of Table 7 using the sub-sample of grades 5 to 12, where the
reform had its biggest effect, we obtain OLS estimates that are closer to the IV estimates
in Table 7. For example, the OLS estimate of the effect of schooling on the probability or
working in the public sector is 0.039 whereas the IV estimate using the whole sample was
0.056 in Table 7. Hence, a modified LATE explanation for the high IV estimates is that our
instrument is affecting education at grades where the effect on the public sector is partic-
ularly high. This pattern of results is very similar to what Riddell and Song (2001) report
when estimating the effect of schooling on the incidence of unemployment in the U.S.
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Figure 5 Probablility of working in the public sector administration andmultinational companies by
grades completed. Coefficients of a regression of working in the public administration (left panel) and in
multinationals (right panel) on a full set of grades completed dummies.
Furthermore, the non-linearity of the OLS estimates is consistent with “sheepskin effects”
associated with the completion of secondary school, an issue we return to below8.
Table 8 shows the IV estimates of educational attainment on the probability of work-
ing in the selected occupations by sector. In addition to coefficients and standard errors,
the table reports the size of each occupation in each sector. The coefficients of the table
are generally positive with two important types of exception. First, coefficients on natural
science scientific/technical occupations are essentially zero, for all sectors. Second, coef-
ficients are generally essentially zero for the multinational sector, except for clerical jobs.
The coefficients for company directors and “other scientists” (economists, lawyers, etc.)
is thus positive for the public sector, but zero for the multinational sector. To illustrate
this pattern of results, we present the reduced from effects of the reform on working as
a company director in different industries in Figure 6. The graphs in this figure plot the
fraction of the labor force employed in this occupation by sector as well as the predic-
tions from regressions where the probabilities are regressed on the 3rd order polynomial
of birth cohorts with the instrument turned on (solid line) and off (dashed line)9. These
figures show the dramatic drop in the probability of working as a director in the public
sector while there is essentially no drop in the case of multinationals.
4.3 Discussion of the results
The results presented above indicate that the changes in educational attainment gener-
ated by the policy changes in the 1970’s clearly had an effect on the employment status
of Tunisian men. The pattern of effects we find suggests that the public sector rewards
skills or features of the formal education that appear to have little value for the more open
sector. Education has a strong effect on the probability of working in most white collar
occupations in the public sector, whereas it has essentially no effect on most occupations
in the multinational sector.
As is always the case with instrumental variables, these results do not tell us anything
about whose education and labor market status was effected. In our case, the nature of
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Table 8 IV results on the effect of education on different occupations and sectors
Public admin Public company Private Tunisian
company
Multinat All
Company Director 0.00491 0.00137 0.00313 0.00053 0.0103
(0.00067)*** (0.00039)*** (0.00076)*** (0.00033) (0.0011)***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.002] [0.020]
Natural Scientist -0.00048 0.00019 -0.00014 -0.000059 -0.000078
(0.00047) (0.00029) (0.00044) (0.000221) (0.000779)
[0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.0009] [0.010]
Other Scientist 0.00228 0.00011 0.00122 0.00022 0.00498
(0.00046)*** (0.00019) (0.00034)*** (0.00015) (0.00071)***
[0.004] [0.0006] [0.003] [0.0005] [0.010]
Natural Science
Technician
0.00027 0.00024 0.00058 -0.00024 0.00059
(0.00051) (0.00039) (0.00046) (0.00022) (0.00087)
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.001] [0.015]
Other Technician 0.00154 0.00063 0.00179 -0.00000011 0.00397
(0.00061)** (0.00026)** (0.00053)*** (0.00019530) (0.00093)***
[0.006] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0009] [0.016]
Secretary 0.0078 0.00109 0.00332 0.00048 0.0129
(0.0011)*** (0.00049)** (0.00069)*** (0.00026)* (0.0014)***
[0.02] [0.003] [0.008] [0.001] [0.036]
Receptionist 0.00075 0.00091 0.00146 0.00027 0.00397
(0.00046) (0.00028)*** (0.00035)*** (0.00014)** (0.00069)***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.0005] [0.009]
Coefficients for grades completed in OLS and 2SLS regressions of working in different occupations and sectors on grades
completed and a birth cohort polynomial. Outcome variables are dummy variables taking value one if the individual works
in the respective occupation and sector and zero otherwise (i.e. the first cell uses a dummy with value one for individuals
working as company directors in the public sector and zero for the rest). 2SLS estimates use reform exposure as instrument.
All estimates use the census data. The figures in square brackets show the proportion of the workforce in each occupation in
each sector. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.
the policy change that we use to instrument educational attainment suggests that those
whose education was affected by the policy were the ones on the margin of gaining an
access to secondary school. Hence, we are most likely estimating the effects of educational
attainment on the employment status for individuals that are among the weakest students
who continue their studies beyond primary school. The results in Table 8 provide further
suggestive evidence that, in our opinion, supports the interpretation that the compliers
are academically weaker students. According to these results formal education did not
help the the compliers of our instrument to obtain white collar jobs in natural science
occupations, where the technical skills acquired at school are most necessary. This inter-
pretation is reinforced by the fact that the reform did not affect the acquisition of PhD
diplomas.
If one accepts this interpretation, our IV results suggest that both the public and, to
a lesser extent, the Tunisian corporate sector do absorb certain types of workers by
virtue of their formal education, regardless of skill. This pattern is most remarkable
when it comes to managers. We find strong effects of education on obtaining manage-
rial positions in the public and private Tunisian sectors, but not in the multinational
one. Relative to the size of the occupations in each sector, the size of the effects is very
large. For instance, in the public sector, where the effects are largest in relative terms,
an additional grade completed increases the chances of becoming a manager by 0.5 pp.,
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Figure 6 Proportion of company directors by birth year in different sectors. Graphical depiction of the
reduced form for company directors in different sectors. Black dots show the share of company directors in
the respective sector of each cohort. The solid line corresponds to the prediction of this share from a
regression on a polynomial of birth cohort and the instrument. The dashed line is the same but with the
instrument turned off.
a large quantity for a type of occupation that employs 0.6% of the population. Such
strong effects of formal education on becoming a manager for a group students likely
to be academically weak suggests that it is not primarily skill acquisition, but rather for-
mal titles (i.e. “sheepskin effects”) that drives employment and promotions in the public
sector.
An alternative explanation for this result could be that multinationals require managers
of higher skill than the public sector. Then, the “marginal” students presumably shocked
by our instrument would not have become managers in the multinational sector any-
way, and the differential results for the public and multinational sectors would emerge
without sheepskin effects playing a role10. If this alternative explanation was correct, one
would expect managers in multinationals to be more skilled than in the public sector. The
figures in Table 4, which we discussed above, suggest otherwise. Table 4 clearly shows that
managers in the public sector have higher mean years of education than managers in the
multinational sector. To probe further into the matter it is useful to check the full educa-
tion distribution of managers by sector. This is done in Figure 7. The distributions of the
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Figure 7 Distribution of grades completed for managers in different sectors.
four sectors look very similar. If anything, public sector managers appear slightly more
educated overall, thus making this alternative explanation unlikely.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the effect of education on occupational status of Tunisian men,
with the aim of obtaining insights into the possible inefficient absorption of educated
workers into the public sector. We exploit a change in education policy that reduced pro-
motion rates into secondary school from 1971 to 1980. The policy change is shown to
have had a substantial effect on educational attainment of the cohorts affected. We use
exposure to the policy as instrument for educational attainment.
Our findings suggest a limited acquisition of skills from schooling by the compliers of
our instrument. The instrument we use is likely to have shocked the educational attain-
ment of the academically weakest students and, indeed, we find an effect of education on
white collar occupations where formal education is likely to be less relevant. In spite of
this, we find that formal schooling increases substantially the chances of obtaining a man-
agerial position in the public sector, a pattern not found in the multinational sector. This
pattern of results is consistent with “sheepskin” effects, where hiring and promotions are
based on titles rather than acquired skill in the public sector.
Our results are thus consistent with misallocation of labor towards and within the pub-
lic sector. The normative implications of this are however not straightforward. In contexts
where clientelism is prevalent (as it is likely to have been in the case of Tunisia during
the period considered), the only realistic alternative may be an even more inefficient and
inequitable allocation of jobs based on patronage. Having a clear set of rules for hiring and
promotions in the public sector may reduce the scope of bureaucratic elites to allocate
jobs for their personal gain.
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Endnotes
1Our identification strategy is very similar to the one that Harmon and Walker (1995),
Oreopoulos (2006), and Pischke and von Wachter (2008) have used to estimate the
returns to education in industrialized countries.
2The two datasets are available at http://www.ins.nat.tn/modules/nada/index.php/
catalog.
3The Labor Force Survey also includes questions on wages. However, this information
is not released to researchers.
4In our analyses involving wealth, we merge the individual with its corresponding
household dataset and we further restrict ourselves to household heads, leading to
294,068 for the Census data and 75,200 for the LFS.
5When using the Labor Force Survey data we also include a control variable for
retirement in equation (1) since part of our sample has reached the retirement age by
2010.
6The fact that PhD diplomas are unaffected by the reform reinforces the interpretation
that the compliers of the instrument are those relatively academically weak, that would
not have proceeded to study a PhD anyway.
7See the discussion in Card (2001) on the traditional LATE interpretation for the
pattern the IV estimates of the returns to schooling exceed the OLS estimates.
8An additional factor that can help explaining why the OLS estimate is lower than the
IV one for the public sector is the presence of age-schooling interaction effects: because
young people are more likely to have higher education but less likely to work, the OLS
returns to education in terms of employment tend to be lower for the young than for the
cohorts affected by the policy. Thus, if in addition to restricting our sample to those with
grades 5 to 12, we restrict it also to the cohorts born between 1950 and 1970 (those close
to the policy change), the OLS estimate for public sector employment raises further to
0.047, which is fairly close to the IV estimate.
9In order to facilitate comparisons across sectors, the scale of each graph is set relative
to the size of the sector.
10We would like to thank the editor this insight.
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